Strategic distance

Confidence in geopolitics is rarely lost all at once. It weakens gradually, the way long standing assumptions begin to loosen. One such assumption in our region was that an external superpower would always act as the final stabilizer in the Gulf. That period is changing.

The global policeman is no longer inclined to manage every fire. The result is a Gulf that is increasingly shaped by its own middle powers rather than by distant capitals.

This is not a withdrawal in a dramatic sense. The superpower remains present, but less inclined to underwrite stability as a public good. In the space created by this recalibration, regional actors are increasing their reach, their security engagement, and their influence. Their ambitions are not only quite real, their ability to project power is also growing. And as middle powers become more assertive, the probability that competition between them spills outward rises alongside their confidence.

Participation in such competition as a junior partner does not guarantee insulation from risk. It may instead place the volunteer directly in the line of compensatory pressure. In other words, joining someone else’s rivalry does not create stability. It may invite blowback.

Pakistan needs to recognize how different this moment is from earlier cycles of global conflict. In the past, when the world’s most powerful actor called, the choice for states such as ours was stark. Refusal could have existential consequences. In turn, cooperation often came with significant financial rents and diplomatic indulgence.

The current environment is different. The emerging rivalry is not between a superpower and the rest. It is between near equals within the Gulf itself. Choosing one over the other will not produce the strategic dividends that once accompanied alignment with Washington. It is more likely to produce costs on both sides of the ledger. Pakistan would be mistaken to approach this moment as if it were a repeat of 2001 or even 2022. It is not.

There is also no external instruction to participate. No coalition, no formal invitation, no ultimatum. Yet there are signs that Pakistan may still choose to act as a willing participant in a contest where it has not been explicitly asked to contribute. That willingness may be a function of habit. Or perhaps of the mistaken belief that the familiar rents of the past will return. They almost certainly will not. The financial and political buffers that once existed are not on offer in the same way when the conflict is between regional middle powers jockeying for influence rather than led by a global superpower in a unipolar world.

History also suggests caution. The last time strategic competition inside the Gulf turned into a cold confrontation, Pakistan tried to keep a foot in every camp. The intent was equilibrium. In practice, the posture looked hesitant and reactive. Those who expected a clearer signal responded with distance rather than understanding. The lesson is not that neutrality is impossible. The lesson is that neutrality, if it is the chosen path, must be articulated early, applied consistently, and understood in all capitals. Quiet distance needs doctrine, not improvisation.

Complicating matters further is the structure of Pakistan’s own elite political economy. The strategic security instincts of the state have traditionally pointed in one direction. The financial footprint of the elite class, however, is concentrated in another jurisdiction. That creates a misalignment in incentives that increases fragility. Any escalation in regional rivalry has the potential to affect not only remittances and deposits, but also the safety of privately held wealth and reputational standing abroad.

None of this implies that Pakistan should disengage from the Gulf. Quite the opposite. The region remains central to our economic viability. Labor markets, remittances, trade, investment, deposits, and even diplomatic cover at difficult moments are all connected to Gulf partners. What it does imply is that Pakistan must avoid inserting itself into contests it cannot shape and will not win.

The greatest strategic mistake would be to view Gulf middle power rivalry as a fresh source of geopolitical rent. That model belonged to a different era. There is no global guarantor prepared to absorb risk on our behalf. There is no external underwriting comparable to what existed two decades ago. Volunteers in someone else’s contest rarely enjoy the insurance cover afforded to conscripts.

Pakistan’s policy task therefore is not conceptually complex. It is to maintain long standing anchor relationships while signaling no partisanship. It is to strengthen domestic institutions so that narrative pressure from outside does not translate into internal volatility. It is to separate economic need from foreign policy performance theatre. Above all, it is to resist the temptation to appear useful in conflicts where utility increases exposure.

A middle power rivalry is forming in the Gulf. It will present itself through subtle changes first. A tone shift in statements. A cooling in one forum and a warming in another. A hint of preference where neutrality once sufficed. If the rivalry deepens, the cost of being seen to choose will be high. The cost of choosing incorrectly may be higher still.

Strategic distance in this environment is not detachment. It is prudence. Pakistan should keep its balance. And it should keep it visibly.

Because the simple truth is this. We cannot afford anything else.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2026